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   Abstract  
 
Several countries have experienced lengthy periods of political deadlock in 
recent years, as they have sought to form a new government. This study 
examines whether government formation deadlocks damagea country’s 
economy. To do so, we analyze the case of Belgium, which took a record 541 
days to create a post-election government, following the June 2010 federal 
elections. Employing the synthetic control method, our results show that the 
Belgian economy did not suffer an economic toll; on the contrary, GDP per 
capita growth was higher than would have otherwise been expected. As such, 
our evidence contradicts frequent claims that long periods of government 
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Lengthy government formation processes in parliamentary regimes after a general election 
are hardly new. While Diermeier and Van Roozendaal (1998) reported an average of 36 
days for the post-election formation of government in a broad sample of European 
parliamentary countries in the period 1945-1990, some individual countries presented a 
considerably longer average, for example, Belgium with 57 and the Netherlands with 88 
days. Indeed,in that period, the Netherlands went a record 208 days without a full-powered 
government in 1977, and Belgium went 106 days in 1987(Diermeier and Van Roozendaal, 
1998; Hooghe, 2012a, Louwerse and Van Aelst,2013). 
Besides the traditional constraints on government formation in parliamentary 
democracies (Strøm, Budge, and Laver, 1994), formation deadlocks have become more 
prominent in recent timesin most European countries (Louwerse and Van Aelst, 2013) 
because ofthe increasing fragmentation of parliaments (De Winter and Dumont, 2008)and 
because multilevel governance in the European Union has absorbed some of the core tasks 
performed by conventionalMember States (Bouckaert and Brans, 2012; Deschouwer, 2012; 
Hooghe, 2012a). As a result, government formation deadlock extended over more than six 
months in Belgium after the June 2007 election,10 months in Spain after the December 
2015election,seven months in the Netherlands after the March 2017 election,six months in 
Germany after the September 2017 election, and three months in Italy after the March 
2018 election. However, the record is held by Belgium,which took the not insignificant 
number of 541 days,following the June 2010 election, to establish a full-powered 
government (Brans, Pattyn, and Bouckaert, 2016). 
The claim is typically made that the costs associated with government formation 
deadlock and the absence of a full-powered government are transferred to the economy. 
Yet, the macroeconomic figures regarding their effects are contradictory. For instance, the 




2016, years in which the two countries faced government formation deadlocks. In contrast, 
however, in similar situations of impasse, the real GDP growth rate rose in Belgium in 
2007 and in the Netherlands in 2017. The picture is further confused when we compare the 
performance of these countries’ economies during their respective periods of deadlock 
with the economic performance of other EU countries that were not experiencing 
situations of political impasse at that time.  
The key question, though, is not so much whether these countries performed better or 
worse than their EU counterparts, but whether their respective rates of economic growth 
were higher or lower than what they would have otherwise been in the absence of 
government formation deadlock. In this article, we empirically evaluate the economic 
performance of Belgium during the longest period of deadlock ever recorded in the 
formation of a full-powered government following an election.To do so, we use the 
synthetic control method, a statistical method that has received growing attention in recent 
times having been used to evaluate treatment effects in different policy areas.1 Our paper, 
in dealing with the economic consequences of an exceptional political situation, can be 
considered similar to the studies of Abadie and Gardeazábal (2003) on the economic 
consequences of terrorism in Spain, and which exploited the variability provided by a truce; 
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015) on the economic cost of German reunification; 
Grier and Maynard (2016) on the economic consequences of Hugo Chavez’s policies in 
Venezuela; and Gharehgozli, (2017) on the economic effects of international sanctions on 
Iran. 
In this study, we take the GDP per capita growth rate as the best indicator of overall 
economic performance, and use the synthetic control method to build an appropriate 
                                                             
1For instance,health and nutrition policies (Bauhoff, 2014; Kreif et al., 2016), energy policies 
(Munasib and Rickman, 2015; Kim and Kim, 2016), industrial policies (Castillo et al., 2017), local 
amalgamations (Roesel, 2017), transportation (Percoco, 2015), international sanctions (Gharehgozli, 
2017), international trade agreements (Aytug et al., 2015), crime interventions (Saunders et al., 2015) 




counterfactual. This enables us to identify and isolate the gap between the actual growth 
rate in Belgian GDP per capita and the rate at which it would have grown without 
government formation deadlock. In this way, we contribute to the existing literature by 
offering what is, to the best of our knowledge, the first evaluation of the effect of a lengthy 
period of political impasse on economic growth.Additionally, we provide original insights 
into  the effects of government formation deadlock in Belgium as yet unidentified in the 
literature.    
We organize the rest of the article as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
quality of government and on the differences between governance and government, the 
stream of literature that provides the best theoretical foundations in which to frame our 
research. Section three briefly reviews the political process that was played out in Belgium 
after the June 2010 federal elections,which led to the government formation deadlock that 
was not broken until December 2011.In section four, we provide a brief analysis of the 
economic policy implemented by the caretaker government, and report various descriptive 
statistics onBelgium’s economic evolution before, during, and after the deadlock. Section 
fivepresents the empirical strategy employed, the synthetic control method, and the results 
obtained. Finally, we discuss our findings and draw our conclusions. 
 
2. Economic governance and government: The quality of government institutions 
While an awareness of the importance of institutions for fostering economic development 
is hardly new (see, for instance, Adam Smith, 1776), it was not until the last decades of the 
past century that the importance of quality of government for such development acquired 
widespread recognition in the literature, above all following the seminal study by North 
(1981) (e.g. De Long and Shleifer, 1993, Knack and Keef, 1995; Mauro, 1995; Easterly and 
Levine 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999;La Porta et al., 1999; Easterly, 2001). Throughout the 
current century, quality of government has gained increasing relevance not only in the 




(Adserà, Boix, and Payne, 2003; Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2012;Rothstein, Samanni, and Teorell, 2012; Fortunato and Panizza, 2015; Rodríguez-Pose 
and Di Cataldo, 2015; Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015). Indeed, in recent years, 
various international organizations and research institutions have built and disseminated 
databases containing quality of governance indicators. Prime examples include the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and the Quality of Government Index created 
by the University of Gothenburg. 
Governance, it should be stressed, is not to be confused with government – in the 
words of Dixit (2009:6): “[…] governance and government should not be regarded as 
almost synonymous” and he offers the following definition of economic governance: “the 
structure and functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic activity 
and economic transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking 
collective action to provide physical and organizational infrastructure” (Dixit, 2009:5). 
Thus, while government is clearly an important part of governance, in almost all countries 
other social institutions of economic governance (whether public or private) also exist. 
Rothstein and Teorell (2009: 168) claim that good governance cannot be considered 
simply as what is good for economic development, because quality of government has 
many important non-economic consequences, such as social trust and subjective well-
being. Indeed, theirs is a very well-grounded critique. Note, in this regard, that the aim of 
our paper is to evaluate the economic effects of government formation deadlocks and, 
more specifically,their impact on GDP per capita growth, which we contend is the best 
indicator of an economy’s overall performance. Evaluating the effects in other non-
economic areas is not the objective of our study and, moreover, data availability would 
represent much more of a problem. 
While we are aware of the criticism expressed by Rothstein and Teorell (2009) and, 




proposed by LaPorta et al. (1999) for the empirical study of the economic effects of the 
quality of government to be of particular interest for our research here. In evaluating 
economic performance, a first group of measures focuses on government intervention in 
the economy and, more specifically, on the quality of regulation and protection of property 
rights. An additional dimension for evaluating good government in LaPorta et al. (1999) is 
that of efficiency of government and quality of bureaucracy. In a similar vein, Keech and 
Munger (2015:11) emphasize meritocracy, recruitment and promotion, and autonomy as 
requirements for high quality administrative institutions. Based on the dimensions of 
quality of government proposed, LaPorta et al. (1999: 234) subsequently provide a set of 
indexes to measure government intervention (including quality of business regulation, tax 
rates, survey scores on corruption, bureaucratic delays, etc.). To these indicators, Rodrik 
(2007) adds informal social institutions that foster trust and social cohesion. A synthesis of 
proxies for quality of government has been suggested inCharron and Lapuente (2013) and 
Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente (2014). These includelow levels of corruption, rule of law, 
government effectiveness, and protection of property rights. Frequent use of all these 
dimensions hasbeen made in analyzing the effects of quality of government (Holmberg, 
Rothstein and Nasiritousi, 2009).      
 
3. Belgium’s record-beating political deadlock(2010-2011) 
Political process  
The Belgian general election held on June 13, 2010, resulted in a highly fragmented political 
landscape, with 11 different parties winning seats in the Chamber of Representatives. 
Table 1records the names of the parties elected and the percentage of votes each received, 
and compares these results with the number of seats they obtained in the previous federal 
election.The parties forming the pre-election government coalition (that is, CD&V, MR, 
PS, Open_vld, and CDH)obtained a total of 83 seats, down from 90 in the previous 




in total), it should be recalled that the election had actually been provoked by Open_vld 
resigning from government(Abts, Poznyak, and Swyngedouw, 2012).Thus, the incumbent 
parties in fact controlled just 70 seats, less than half the Chamber. The high degree of 
political fragmentation inevitably hampered negotiations to form a new cabinet. Of the 150 
representatives, the leading party (17.4% of votes) controlled just 27 seats. A further six 
parties had more than 10 seats, but only one of these had more than 20. 
 
 
Table 1. General Election results, Belgium 2010. Distribution of votes and number of seats 
in the house of representatives by political party. 
Notes: F: Flemish; V; Walloon  
(a) Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie formed and electoral alliance with Christen-Democratisch en 
Vlaams in the 2007 election, holding 5 of the 30 seats obtained by CDV.  
 (b) Parti Populaire was formed in 2009 
Source: Federal Public Services Home Affairs (Belgium), and authors. 
 
 
The situation was complicatedstill further because of the difficulty in complying with 
various unwritten rules of government formation [including, for example, ‘linguistic 
cleavage’, and the need for regional parties belonging to the same broad political family to 
be in government (Deschouwer, 2009)]. Thus, fragmentation combined with ideological 
differences and increasing tensions between the Flemish and Walloon regions impeded 
government formation. The leader of NV-A and winner of the elections, Bart de Wewer, 






F Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie  N-VA 17.4 27 (a) 
V Parti Socialiste  PS 13.7 26 20 
F Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams CD&V 10.8 17 30 
V Mouvement Réformateur MR 9.3 18 23 
F Socialistische Partij Anders sp.a 9.2 13 14 
F Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten Open vld 8.6 13 18 
F Vlaams Belang VB 7.8 12 17 
V Centre Démocrate Humaniste CDH 5.5 9 10 
V Ecolo 4.8 8 8 
F Groen! 4.4 5 4 
F Libertair, Direct, Democratisch LDD 2.3 1 5 
V Parti Populaire PP 1.3 1 (b) 




was designated by King Albert to take the initiative in government formation (formateur), 
but he resignedin early July 2010(Abts, Poznyak, and Swyngedouw, 2012). He was followed 
in the role by Elio Di Rupo, leader of the Socialist Party in Wallonia, but the impossibility 
of reaching a consensus led to his resignation in the first week of September.2 
The presidents of the Belgian Senate and of the Chamber of Representatives were then 
asked by the king to mediate between the political parties, but were dismissed in early 
October 2010when negotiations between the main parties broke down. Newmediatorswere 
appointed while the king asked the former prime minister to stay on as a caretaker 
government with limited powers. The two main issues blocking any agreement were the 
model of funding for Brussels and the regions, and certain institutional questions affecting 
the Senate and the electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde(Abts, Poznyak, and 
Swyngedouw, 2012). The latter was the subject of a highly sensitive dispute between 
Walloon parties (that wanted it to remain as a single district) and Flemish parties (that 
wanted the district to be split in two).3 
In May 2011, negotiations were revived once more with the designation of Di Rupo as 
formateur, in a final push before calling for new elections. In October, an agreement for 
institutional reform was finally reached, but the obstacles to the formation of a new 
government only disappeared at the end of November.A final agreement was reached on 5 
December 2011, with a new fragile six-party coalition led by Di Rupo (PS) as Prime 
Minister, and formed by Socialist, Christian Democrat and Liberal parties from both 
regions.And so ended the longest ever period of political deadlock in a democratic, 
parliamentary regime – 541 days of deadlock and 589 without a full-powered government – 
surpassing the 353 days of government deadlock in Cambodia in 2003-04. 
 
                                                             
2 Di Rupo tendered his resignation on August 29th, but the king refused to accept it and asked him 
to continue with his efforts to break the deadlock.  
3It coincides with the bilingual (French and Dutch) administrative district of the Brussels-Capital 






4. Economic policy and economic performance under the caretaker government 
Economic policyunder the caretaker government  
Immediately following the resignation of the government in April 2010, government 
services issued two circulars specifying the conventions and guidelines for the caretaker 
government4 [26 April and 7 May, 2010 (Brans, Pattyn, and Bouckaert, 2016)].The political 
deadlock greatly diminished the capacity of this caretaker government from intervening in 
the economycompared to the powers enjoyed by an elected government.Thus, the 2011 
budgetwas not in fact approved until May 2011;and,in the meantime, the caretaker 
government had to pass regular resolutions prolonging the 2010 budget on a month to 
month basis, in keeping with the system known as ‘provisionary 12th’s”, whereby 
government departments continued to receive the same budgetary allocations received in 
the previous year, generally for three-month periods (Bouckaert and Brans 2012; Brans, 
Pattyn, and Bouckaert, 2016).Day-to-day affairs were overseen by this temporary caretaker 
government but no major decisions could be taken with regard to economic policy, and 
more specifically concerning the budget or national debt.  
The absence of a new federal budget meant a number of automatic savings, given that 
budgeting is typically done on the basis of the previous year’s budget with an inflation 
adjustment (Bouckaert and Brans, 2012; Hooghe, 2012a); however, the government did not 
implement any structural financial measures (OECD, 2011: 31). According to Bouckaert 
and Brans (2012: 174), the caretaker government did, however, have to face a number of 
pressing matters, such as complying with international defense commitments (i.e. NATO 
                                                             
4 The concept of a ‘caretaker government’had emerged immediately after the II World War [see 
Davies (1946); Morgan (1946); Woolbert, 1946)], and designates the government that takes care of 
ordinary issues in transitory periods provoked by the resignation or destitution of a government, or 
an election in parliamentary regimes, until a new government is elected by Parliament. Caretaker 
governments are understood to be responsible solely for ‘ordinary’ issues, and should not adopt any 





operations in Libya), introducing migrationlegislation, and contributing to EU measures to 
support the Euro, etc.But no major structural policy reforms were implemented (Troupin, 
 Steen, and Stroobants, 2015) that might have affected critical issues in the domain of 
pension systems, social affairs, energy supply and environment, employment and labor 
market, and competitiveness (Brans, 2012; Brans, Pattyn and Bouckaert, 2016). 
However, with the passing months, even though the caretaker government was 
appointed to do only ‘what is necessary for the country’ (Hooghe, 2012a; Deschouwer, 
2012), theunderstanding of just what was necessary expanded in more than one domain. 
Thus, the government approved a new budget in March 2011 (the first time this had ever 
occurred under a caretaker government) and the new 2011 Budget was passed by 
Parliament in May. These new budget provisions served as the basis for the Belgian 
Stability Program 2011-2014 (FGB, 2011), submitted to the European Commission (EC) in 
April 2011. In this program, the Belgian Government committed itself to a GDP deficit of 
3.6 percent in 2011, and less than 3 percent in 2012. However, budget adjustments were 
below expectations. The European Council (2011, points 8&9) advised Belgium to increase 
its fiscal consolidation efforts. Similarly, in fall 2011, the EC made further calls for 
budgetary discipline from the Member States, but the caretaker government argued that 
implementing EU demands and avoiding penaltiesmeant adopting measures that lay 
beyond its designated authority.  
These events ran in parallel withincreasing concerns in the financial markets, alarmed 
by the lack of progress made in reducing public deficit. In November 2010,Belgium was 
added to the list of countries,made up of Portugal, Spain and Italy,which it was feared 
could be heading for a financial crisis, This obviously had an impact on the government 
bond market. The risk premium steadily increased after April 2011, peaking in November 
2011. The spread on Belgian 10-year bonds (relative to the German Bund) rose to more 




and 60 basis points, respectively (European Commission, 2012). Given the high, and 
increasing, level of public debt, the Belgian public sector remained vulnerable to market 
pressures (European Commission, 2012).By late November 2011, this pressure from the 
financial markets seems likely to have affectedthe negotiating parties and political elites 
(Devos and Sinardet, 2012), and a short time after (5 December 2011) a new government 
was formed, much to the relief of the financial markets.   
Belgian GDP performance during the political crisis 
Despite the political deadlock and the limited powersof the caretaker government, 
Belgium’s economic performance does not appear to have suffered much. If we observe 
the GDP growth rate (Figure 1), Belgian performance between 2010 and 2014was slightly 
better than the EU average, and also better than the euro area average, though in the latter 
case only until 2013.  
 
Figure 1. Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate (2006-2016) 
  
However, this comparison tells us only how Belgium performance compared with that 
of the other countries of Europe, but it offers no insights as to how it might have 
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what is relevant is not how Belgium performed in comparison with other countries, but 
rather how much better or worse it would have performed in the absence of political 
deadlock. Given that this outcome cannot be observed, it constitutes our counterfactual. 
Indeed, its apparently better comparative performance in Europe could be 
hidingdetrimental economic consequences of its institutional crisis. 
The following section describes the empirical strategy we adopt to construct the 
counterfactual so that we can assess how the government formation deadlock 
affectedeconomic growth in Belgium.  
5. Empirical strategy 
The goal of our empirical study is to assess the impact that the delay in government 
formation had on Belgium’s economic growth. The effect of the treatment – that is, the 
2010 federal elections – is estimated using the synthetic control method (Abadie and 
Gardeazábal, 2003; Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller, 2010, 2015). This policy evaluation 
tool is especially appropriate for comparative case studies and specifically designed to 
evaluate the treatment effects of major events impacting units of analysis that are often 
aggregate entities, such as countries, for which no suitable single comparisons are available. 
Hence, the method is suitable for evaluating exceptional political situations, as illustrated in 
the seminal paper by Abadie and Gardeazábal (2003), and in the more recent studies of 
Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015), Grier and Maynard (2016) and Gharehgozli 
(2017). 
The method is also appropriate for use if there exists a donor pool of control units 
that are unaffected by the event – as is the case in our setting – given that we are studying a 
political situation limited to Belgium. Furthermore, using a weighted average of units as a 
comparison precludes the type of model-dependent extrapolation on which regression 




Table 2 reports the pretreatment values of several variables typically associated 
with a country’s growth potential. As in the aforementioned literature, a comparison is 
made between the evolution in Belgium’s GDP per capita growth rate and that of a 
weighted combination of EU countries selected to resemble the characteristics of the 
Belgian economy before the political deadlock.This weighted average of values for these 
other EU countries is conceptualized as a “synthetic” Belgium without the political 
deadlock experienced between 2010 and 2011, against which the values for the “real” 
Belgiumcan then be compared.The donor pool used in the comparison includes a sample 
of the EU-28 countries. Unfortunately, Croatia, Cyprus and Luxembourg had to be 




Table 2.  Economic growth predictor means for real Belgium and synthetic Belgium. 
Averaged 1999-2009 
Predictors Belgium Synthetic Pool 
Ln(GDPpc_lag) 10.25 10.25 9.59 
low_education 38.09 38.41 29.96 
mid_education 35.55 37.57 48.09 
high_education 26.33 24.03 20.66 
Population_density 341.68 272.03 170.73 
ln(investment rate) 3.10 3.11 3.11 
Trade Surplus 3.55 3.40 0.35 
Inflation 2.02 2.27 2.95 




As described in Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015), the difference between 
the preintervention characteristics of the treated unit and the synthetic control is given by 
the vector X1-X0W, where X1 is the vector of features of the treated unit, X0 the vector of 
features of the control units, and W a weight matrix. Here, we select the synthetic control, 
W*, which minimizes the size of this difference during the pretreatment period. Abadie and 
Gardeazábal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2015) choose W* as the value 
of W that minimizes∑ 𝑣𝑚(𝑋1𝑚 − 𝑋0𝑚𝑊)
𝑘




importance assigned to the m-th variable when the discrepancy between X1 and X0W is 
measured.  
The implementation of this method confirms that thesynthetic unit is, in fact, a 
better comparison unit than the pool of potential donor countries, as it resembles the 
treated unit more closely in terms of predictors (Table 2).Overall, this suggests that 
synthetic Belgium provides a better point of comparison than the population-weighted 
average of the pool. 
The synthetic unit comprises the unequal contributions of the control units. Table 
3presents the weight matrix for the donor pool, where the synthetic weight is the country 
weight assigned to each country. When the algorithm is applied to create a synthetic 
control, a control is obtained made up of the four main contributors, that is, the 
Netherlands (55.8%), Spain (19.6%), France (18.1%) and the United Kingdom (5.7%). Italy 
also plays a role here, but only a minor one (0.1%). The rest of the countriesdo not 
contribute to the synthetic unit. When using this control to predict Belgium’s GDP per 
capita from 1999–2009, the root mean squared percentage error (RMSPE) is 0.017, or less 
than 2 percent. 
 
Table 3. Weight matrix. Donor Pool.  
Country Unit Weight Country Unit Weight 
Bulgaria 0 Hungary 0 
Czech Rep. 0 Malta 0 
Denmark 0 Netherlands 0.558 
Germany 0 Austria 0 
Estonia 0 Poland 0 
Ireland 0 Portugal 0 
Greece 0 Romania 0 
Spain 0.196 Slovenia 0 
France 0.181 Slovakia 0 
Italy 0.008 Finland 0 
Latvia 0 Sweden 0 







Figures 2 and 3 report the main results. Figure 2 shows how the path taken by synthetic 
Belgium’s GDP per capita closely resembles that taken by real Belgium’s GDP until 2009, 
that is, before the 2010 turning point. The credibility of a synthetic control depends upon 
just how well it tracks the treated unit’s characteristics and outcomes during the 
pretreatment period. Here, the synthetic Belgium control appears to provide good tracking. 
Interestingly, after 2010,the performance of real Belgium is better than that of its 
counterfactual, the gap with respect to the synthetic comparison unit increasing until 2013. 
This would indicatethat the political deadlock faced in forming a government did not 
undermine the growth of the Belgian economy, but, on the contrary, it had a positive 
effect, at least for GDP per capita.  
 
Figure 2. Trends in ln(GDP per capita): real Belgium vs. synthetic Belgium  
 
Figure 3 shows more specifically the gap between both units as evidence of an increasing 
positive difference initiated in 2010–the differences between both units being computed 
over time.  


































Table 4 shows that real Belgium’s GDP per capita in 2010 was about 3.3% higher 
than its counterfactual, with the greatest difference with respect to the synthetic GDP per 
capita being recorded in 2013, when it was 6.6% higher. This result seems to indicate that 
the better performance of real Belgium lasted for approximately three years. After 2013, the 
difference between the two units stopped increasing. 
 
Table 4. GDP per capita: real Belgium vs. synthetic Belgium.   
Year Real Belgium Synthetic Belgium Difference Real Belgium/Synthetic Belgium 
2010 33,681 32,617 1,064 1.033 
2011 34,462 32,928 1,534 1.047 
2012 34,986 32,958 2,028 1.061 
2013 35,225 33,049 2,176 1.066 
2014 35,801 33,685 2,116 1.063 




The “in time” placebo treatment is considered as having taken place in Belgium in 
2006, just before the 2007 world economic and financial downturn and also just before the 
previous federal elections, held on 10 June 2007. The same empirical strategy is applied but 































runs from 1999 to 2005, with an expected treatment effect in 2006. The resulting trajectory 
for this new placebo test is shown in Figure 4. As expected, we are unable to identify any 
significant gap between the paths taken by real Belgium and this new synthetic Belgium. 
The pre/post GDP per capita paths do not present any differences.  
The “in space” placebo tests consider all the units in the donor pool, and we then 
run the same optimization model but treating each of them as having been treated 
iteratively; that is, as if there had been political deadlock in the formation of the national 
government in 2010. We retain those simulations that successfully predicted the pre-
intervention period between 1999 and 2009. To filter this goodness of fit, we use the 
standard, but demanding, rule that excludes those with an RMSPE twice the size of that 
obtained for the real case of Belgium. Thus, those countries presenting an RMSPE greater 
than 3.3% are excluded when we compare the base model to the best placebos. The 
remaining countries are more likely to report a higher placebo effect and are, as such, better 
candidates for inclusion in the placebo distribution (Gharehgozli, 2017).  
 






Figure 5 plots the trajectories for these placebo tests and, as expected, shows 
Belgium to be an outlier.These findings lend support to the contention that the effect 
obtained for Belgium is attributable to the political deadlock and the absence of full-

































Figure 5. Placebo test (“in space”) assuming treatment in non-treated countries (excluding 
RMSPE> 2*RMSPE for Belgium). 
 
7. Discussion  
The results obtained from our analysis using the synthetic control method indicate that the 
rate of growth of Belgium GDP was higher during the period of government formation 
deadlock than it would have been in the same period with a full-powered government in 
office. Most strikingly, in 2011,following almost a whole year without a full-powered 
government, we record the highest relative increase in the gap between what actually 
happened in the Belgium economy and our counterfactual, a regular non-deadlock 
year.After 2012, the difference between the real Belgium and synthetic Belgium ceases to 
grow, and the gap narrows in the following years. 
While our analysis does not, in itself, allow us to seek out an empirical causality to 
explain the, surprisingly, relatively high rate of growth experienced by the Belgian economy 
during the period of government formation deadlock, below we discuss several 
circumstances that may explain why reality did not conform to the expectation that the 















economic turmoil and uncertainty, as that recorded at the beginning of the present decade 
in the eurozone. To do so, we consider the following set of circumstances: (1) Not having a 
full-powered government was not the same as having no government at all; (2) The effect 
of multilevel governance in Belgium; (3) The quality of governance in Belgium; (4) Effects 
on GDP from delaying fiscal consolidation efforts; and (5) The reducedpromotion of 
economic regulationsby government and parliament. 
During the 18 months of deadlock, a caretaker government was always in place. This 
government was empowered to take all decisions in relation to ordinary matters, and urgent 
matters when so needed – in particular those related to the EU and the international arenas 
(Bouckaert and Brans, 2012; Brans, Pattyn, and Bouckaert, 2016)]. According to Bouckaert 
and Brans (2012: 174), as the deadlock became more entrenched, the scope of just what the 
caretaker government could do grew. For example, a new budget was approved by this 
government in March 2011 (and subsequently in May by Parliament). As such, political 
instability was never to express itself as economic uncertainty and instability. Moreover, by 
the time financial instability at the EU level had become extreme (that is, by late fall 2011), 
a full-powered government was then in office. Thus, not having a full-powered federal 
government did not mean the country was without any kind of federal government (Devos 
and Sinardet, 2012; Hooghe, 2012b). 
Furthermore, the absence of a full-powered government at the federal level in Belgium 
must be understood within the broader context of Belgium’s multi-level governance 
structure. Belgium’s federal system assigns a considerable number of functions and 
powersto the three regions, above all to Flanders and Wallonia [while the region of 
Brussels has,in practice, more limited powers (Deschouwer 2009: 61)]. The Belgian regions, 
for example, play a key role in the provision of basic collective goods (education, health, 
infrastructure, etc.). Thus, given the way in which Belgium’s federal structure and party 




translate into political instability at the regional level (Bouckaert and Brans, 2012). 
Furthermore, coordination between federal and regional governments had been fueled by 
the requirements of participation in EU institutions (Beyers and Bursens, 2006). The 
policy-making process at the EU level does not differentiate between full-powered or 
caretaker governments in the Member States, and as such the Belgium caretaker 
government had to meet its obligations with EU governance, including coordination with 
the regions (Deschouwer, 2012). 
Quality of government indicators comprise dimensions that extend beyond the work of 
the executive, especially in a situation where a government’s powers are limited to 
overseeing ordinary matters. As discussed above, economic governanceincludes, among 
others,such dimensions as government effectiveness and control of corruption. According 
to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI-WB) of the World Bank for 2010 (the year 
when the government formation deadlock began), Belgium ranked 10th out of the 28 EU 
countries, indicating it had better governance than most of the Member States. More 
importantly, Belgium ranked 7/28 in terms of Government Effectiveness,Voice and 
Accountability, and 9/28 in terms of Control of Corruption (however, it occupied a fairly 
mediocre position on Regulatory Quality – 14/28). Similarly, Belgium ranked better than 
average (11/28)on the European Quality of Government Index (EQI-QofG) constructed 
by the Quality of Government Institute (University of Gothenburg) for 2010. Elsewhere, 
the 2010 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR-WEF) ofthe World Economic Forum, 
which provides information on key indicators for quality of governance, reported similar 
results for corruption as the WGI-WB, while Belgium ranked 11/28 for trust in politicians, 
and 12/28 for protection of property rights and judiciary independence.5Thus, while 
Belgium does not top the rankings of quality of governance in the European Union 
                                                             
5 WGI-WB data can be consulted at www.govindicators.org (see also specific information for EU 
countries in 2010 in Kaasa, 2013); data for EQI-QofG for 2010 are available at 
https://qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qog-eqi-data; data from GCR-WEF for 2010 are 




(reserved for the Scandinavian countries), its position is above average in terms of most key 
indicators.6 Therefore, the country’s relatively good quality of governance seems likely to 
have played a role in preventing the transfer of political instability into the economic arena 
and generating uncertainty and instability. 
Turning to the public finance dimension, it is perhaps worth recalling that the fact that 
Belgium did not havea new federal budget until May 2011 could have meant some 
automatic savings,given that transitory budgeting procedures would not have updated for 
inflation (Bouckaert and Brans, 2012; Hooghe, 2012a). However, these automatic savings, 
which may have acted as a contractive fiscal policy in ‘regular’ times, occurred amid a sharp 
economic and financial crisis in the EU, which means that limiting fiscal consolidation to 
these automatic changes served as an expansive fiscal policy, at least in comparative terms. 
Indeed, it has been widely documented that the government did not implement any 
structural financial measures (Brans, 2012; Brans, Pattyn, and Bouckaert, 2016; OECD, 
2011; Troupin,  Steen, and Stroobants, 2015). Furthermore, the government failed even to 
meet its commitment with the European Commission to reduce the country’s GDP deficit 
to 3.6 percent in 2011 (FGB, 2011). According to Eurostat data, Belgium’s public deficit 
stood at 4.1% of GDP in 2011, rising from 4.0% in 2010. It is reasonable to think that 
political deadlock undermined the government’s ability to implement a more intense deficit 
reduction and, as such, fiscal adjustment was postponed.7 
Drawing on Eurostat data for EU countries in 2011,we computed Belgium’spublic 
deficit in that year in a scenario in which its financial consolidation had been as intense as 
in the eurozone as a whole. We found that its public deficit would have been 2.8% of GDP 
as opposed to 4.1%. Furthermore, we computed Belgium’s deficit as if it had behaved in 
                                                             
6 A specific issue related to good governance is the quality of bureaucracy, as emphasized in 
LaPorta et al. (1999) and Keech and Munger (2015). See Brans (2012) for an analysis of the role of 
civil servants and public managers in guaranteeing the continuity of government operations.   
7Detailed information on fiscal consolidation measures employed in Belgium between 2009 and 




line with the donor pool of countries in our synthetic control analysis (see Table 3 above): 
we obtained a public deficit of 3.6% (compared to the actual 4.1%). These results support 
the conclusion that the government formation deadlock slowed the pace of fiscal 
consolidation and that this is, in all likelihood, one of the factors that explainsBelgium’s 
relatively higher GDP per capita growth rate.8 
Finally, in the case of quality of regulation and economic performance in Belgium, 
while legislative activity was frozen after the 2010 election, government and parliament 
legislative activity was gradually resumed with the passing months. In the first few months 
of deadlock, government legislative proposals were strictly limited to addressing urgent 
issues, but thereafter its scope of intervention gradually expanded (Pilet, 2012). However, 
no new policy legislative initiatives were taken by the caretaker government (Pilet, 2012: 
98). Van Aelst and Louwerse (2014: 483) report detailed information on Belgium’s 
legislative activity and show that in the 2010-2011 Parliamentary year (full year of 
government formation deadlock), the number of bills passed was 145. Of these, 73 were 
proposed by government and 72 by members of parliament. While this figure is higher 
than that corresponding to the 2007-08 period of deadlock (a total of 116, with 76 being 
proposed by government), it is significantly lower than that recorded in non-deadlock, 
post-election years in the previous decade, when the number of bills passed was regularly 
above 200.In short, the quantity of legislative regulatory activity was less than usualand, 
moreover, no new structural reforms or initiatives were undertaken.  
Interestingly, while most dimensions of quality of governance showed Belgium to be 
performing better than most other EU countries, this picture is dramatically reversed if we 
focus just on regulation. Thus, quality of regulation is the dimension for which Belgium 
                                                             
8A comparison with the countries in the donor pool shows that public deficit as % of GDP in 2011 
grew only in Belgium and Spain, and that the growth rate was relatively higher in Belgium. In all the 
other countries (Netherlands, France, United Kingdom and Italy), public deficit as % of GDP in 





receives its lowest ranking on the WGI-WB, occupying a mediocre 14th position among 
the 28 EU countries in 2010.  The GCI-WEF, likewise, offers information on the 
Regulatory Burden on Firms, and here the perception of Belgium is especially poor: In 
2010 the country ranked 122ndamong 139 countries included in the analysis (i.e. the greater 
the regulatory burden, the lower the ranking), and 22ndamong the 28 EU countries. As 
such, regulatory quality appears to be one of the most important shortcomings of 
economic governance in Belgium. This suggests that the fact that less legislation was passed 
during the government formation deadlock was concomitant with the fact that less bad (for 
economic growth, that is) legislation was passed. It is well documented that the caretaker 
government was never in a position to pass initiatives aimed at making the economy more 
flexible (i.e. the structural reformssuggested by the European Commission), even if there 
had been a will to do so, and that this is rarely an objective of bills sponsored by individual 
members of parliament, the increase in the number of which was a singular feature of this 
record-breaking period of deadlock. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
Our findings in this article run counter to frequently made claims that political deadlocks 
have an economic cost. Following implementation of the synthetic control method, our 
study shows that – in the case of Belgium, at least (the country to date recording history’s 
longest period of political impasse) – not only was there no evidence of any economic 
deterioration, but the country’s economic growth was actuallyhigher than that of its 
counterfactual. 
During the period of deadlock, a government did exist – albeit not a full-powered 
government – that responded to all matters of urgency, and which expanded its scope of 
action as the period of impasse lengthened. Parallel with this, multilevel governance in 




factor that ensured political instability and uncertainty did not impact the economy was the 
relatively high quality of most of the dimensions considered key for economic governance. 
Thus, robust, efficient institutions, beyond government, played a positive role in protecting 
the economy from the difficulties of political deadlock. 
Our study further suggests that delays in fiscal consolidation may account for the 
fact that economic growth was higher than might otherwise have been expected. However, 
while our analysis allows us detect this effect in the short term, the scope of the study 
means we can make no long-term forecasts in this regard. Additionally, given the poor 
quality of regulation in Belgium and the country’s high regulatory burden, less legislative 
activity might well mean that the government formation deadlock provided firms, and the 
overall economy, with a relative regulatory break. 
The structure and levels of government, the separation of powers, and economic 
governance are unique to each country, which means we cannot generalize our findings 
regarding the absence of economic deterioration resulting from government formation 
deadlock in Belgium. Future research needs to analyze other countries that have 
experienced similar (although shorter) periods of impasse to determine the role played by 
idiosyncratic governance characteristics, and to ascertain whether any common patterns 
emerge from different government formation deadlock events. 
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